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et al.: Comments

Comments
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS-SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT OUT OF PROPERTY ON THE
is rather commonly assumed that a judgment creditor has no available means of satisfying his judgment when the debtor's
only property consists of money, bonds, stock certificates, jewelry, etc. which he
carries upon his person., This assumption is based upon a well-settled common law
rule that propery upon the person of the judgment debtor can not be levied upon
under a writ of execution.' The rule originated in the denial to a landlord of the right
PERSON OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR-It

to distrain property on the person of the tenant.' It is not clear whether the rule
was based upon the nature or use of the property or upon the fact that it was carried
upon the tenant's person. But the jealous regard of the common law for preservation of the peace indicates the latter to have been the important consideration.4
Thus, the question is entirely different from that of exemptions of certain kinds of
property, e. g., wearing apparel, from levy.5 The property is not excluded from liability for debt by any positive rule, but is merely placed out of the creditor's reach
by reason of its location.
Is the unscrupulous debtor, then, to be permitted to defy the judgment creditor
by the simple process of converting his property into convenient form and carrying
it inviolate upon his person? Does the creditor have any recourse for obtaining satisfaction of his judgment out of property which the debtor is apparently able to apply
to the judgment debt?
In many states the situation is covered by statutory provisions for proceedings
in aid or supplementary to execution,' which have for their general purpose the satisfaction of the execution issued under a judgment. They usually provide for an order
from the court to the debtor to appear and answer concerning the nature and location of his property.7 If he discloses property which is subject to levy, it may be taken
by regular legal process. But if there are any obstacles to such levy, the court may
order the debtor to deliver the property to the court or its officer for satisfaction
of the debt,' thus obviating the common law objection to a levy as tending to a
breach of the peace. In Missouri there is a statute providing for the order of the court
to the debtor to appear and disclose his property and its location, 9 and if he refuses
to appear or to disclose the nature and location of his property, he may be committed for contempt. 0 But in the event that he does so appear and disclose property
1. The possibility of garnishment in case
of bonds of a domestic corporation or stock
certificates in states permitting attachment
on the books of the corporation is excluded
from consideration.
2. Mack v. Parks, 8 Gray 517 (1858);
Maxham v. Day, 16 Gray 213 (1860).
But cf. Green v. Palmer, 15 Cal. 412 (1860);
State v. Dillard, 3 Ired. L. [N. C.] 102
(1842).

3. Simpson v. Hartopp, Willis
(1744); Gorton v. Falkner, 4 T. R.
(1792); Storey v. Robinson, 6 T. R.
(1795); Sunbolf v. Afford, 3 M. & W.
(1838); Adames v. Field, 12 A. & E.
(1840).
4. Ibid.
5. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1159.
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6. Bond v. Bulgheroni, 215 Cal. 7, 8 P.
(2d) 130 (1932); Baker v. State ex rel.
Mills, 109 Ind. 47, 9 N.E. 711 (1887); State
ex rel. v. Burrows, 33 Kan. 17 (1885);
Importers' and Traders' Nat'l. Bank v.
Quackenbush, 143 N. Y. 567, 38 N. E. 728
(1894); Ohio Valley Bank v. Minter, 108
W. Va. 58, 150 S. E. 366 (1929).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1227.
10. State ex rel. Ames v. Barclay, 86
Mo. 55 (1885). It is possible that the debtor
might assert his privilege against self-incrimination, since the conveyance of property with the intent or design to defraud,
hinder or delay creditors is a misdemeanor.
State ex rel. Strodtman v. Haid, 325 Mo.
1137, 30 S. W. (2d) 466 (1930).

(272)
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which is not subject to levy because found on his person, no provision is made for
an order by the court to deliver such property. And it has been expressly held that
such an order can not be made under the statute."
The creditor is then no nearer solution of his problem than he was before.
Why, then, cannot the creditor, by the familiar judgment creditor's bill, invoke the
aid of an equity court because of the inadequacy of his remedy at law? From very
early times the courts of Chancery have entertained judgment creditor's bills in
which various forms of relief are sought by the creditor, but the ultimate goal is
always satisfaction of his judgment against the debtor.12 Before such a bill will3
be allowed the creditor must allege that he has exhausted his remedies at law.
It is usually necessary, therefore, for him to show that a judgment has been obtained, a writ of execution issued, and that it has been returned unsatisfied.4 But
the return of an execution nulla bona is not always required, if it can be proved
that the issuance of a writ would be ineffectual.is And, indeed, it may not even be
necessary to first secure a judgment in certain cases where it can be shown that a
judgment can not be obtained or is very impracticable.16 To support such a bill a
creditor must also allege that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the debtor
has property which he wrongfully withholds from the creditor. 7 The debtor is
then summoned before the court and examined. If he discloses property in his
possession which is subject to levy, but cannot be reached for any reason, the court
may order him to deliver it to its officer to satisfy the judgment, and his refusal
to do so may be punished by commitment for contempt. 8 If the order is merely
for the payment of money it might be objected that such procedure violates constitutional and statutory provisions against imprisonment for debt."9 But these
provisions are clearly intended to prevent the attachment of the body of a debtor
who is unable to pay his debts and not to prevent a creditor from obtaining satisfaction when the debtor wrongfully refuses to pay the debt, though he has a specific
fund of property which could be applied to the debt.20 These provisions cannot be
so construed as to limit the traditional means employed by an equity court to enforce
its decrees, which would strike directly at its in personam jarisdiction."1
It is submitted, therefore, that the statutory provisions in Missouri have inadequately covered the question and that the creditor may still resort to traditional
equity procedure as permitted under the judgment creditor's bill. It is a well recognized rule of statutory construction that where the common law has not been expressly abrogated or by necessary implication annulled, it remains effective. Indeed,
some statutes providing for such supplementary proceedings have expressly retained
11. In re Knaup, 144 Mo. 653, 46 S. W.
151 (1898).
12. Coleman v. Hagey, 252 Mo. 102,
158 S. W. 829 (1913); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) § 2294. These bills
should be distinguished from the creditor's
bill filed by creditors of a decedent in a suit
to satisfy their claims out of the estate of the
decedent. Perkins v. Warburton, 4 F.
(2d) 742 (D. Md. 1922).
13. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261
U. S. 491 (1923); Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo.
36, 239 S. W. 97 (1922).
14. Merry v. Fremon, 44 Mo. 518 (1869).
15. Steele v. Reid, 284 Mo. 269, 223

S. W. 881 (1920).
16. Pendleton v. Perkins, 49 Mo. 565
(1872); 38 A. L. R. 269.
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17. Coleman v. Hagey, 252 Mo. 102,
158 S. W. 829 (1913).
18. Frazier v. Barnum, 19 N. J. Eq.
316, 97 Am. Dec. 666 (1868); Hadden v.
Spader, 20 Johns. 554 (1822); Ohio Valley
Bank v. Minter, 108 W. Va. 58, 150 S. E.
366 (1929).
19. Mo. COxST. art. II, § 16.
20. Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285
(1865), noted in 37 YALE L. J. 509; State
ex rel. Ames v. Barclay, 86 Mo. 55 (1885);
Carnahan v. Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390
(1906); Ford, Imprisonmentfor Debt, (1926)
25 MIcH. L. REv. 24.
21. 1 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS (3rd ed.
1900) § 8a.
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the judgment creditor's bill.22 And, in general, the creation of statutory devices in
the nature of judgment creditor's bills have been held not to eliminate such a bill;
quite the contrary, it is still available."
It would seem, therefore, that the creditor placed in the troublesome situation
hypothecated is completely without a legal remedy and is a proper subject for relief
through a judgment creditor's bill in equity. It seems reasonably clear that the
creditor's bill is appropriately effective to reach property carried upon the person
of the judgment debtor. Indeed, the power of the court of equity in such a proceeding to make whatever orders and decrees that may be necessary to aid the creditor
is almost limitless.24 Thus, in Frazierv. Barnum,2" the court held that, since jewelry
disclosed in an examination of the debtor might be beyond the reach of a levy, a
receiver should be appointed and an order made directing the debtor to deliver it
to him. In Hadden v. Spader,26 an early New York case, the court said that an equity
court has power to assist a judgment and execution creditor to reach property of
his debtor whenever it is out of reach of execution at law, and that to do so the court
might direct the transfer of choses in action, money and stock. The court accordingly approved a decree of the lower court that the debtor, or his trustee, to whom
he had paid his money, pay it to the creditor in satisfaction of his debt. In In re
Burtn the court sustained an order of the lower court committing a debtor for contempt in refusing to pay over money to his assignee in insolvency as required by
an order of the court. The court said, "It would be an intolerable weakness of the
law if there were not some way to reach this class of men, who prey upon the credit
of the community and then, when caught in their nefarious schemes, appeal to the
technicalities of the law, or the sympathy of those who administer it." In Pendleton
v. Perkins,28 the Missouri court, in sustaining a bill to reach money of a debtor in
the hands of a third person, recognized the possibility of a debtor's defying his
creditors by merely accumulating wealth without having committed any fraud.
The court indicated the availability of a creditor's bill and a court order to make
it effective in such a case. In In re Knaup,9 the Missouri Supreme Court denied a
writ of habeas corpus to a debtor who had been committed for contempt in refusing
to deliver bonds in compliance with a court order. The order was held to have been
properly made under the garnishment statute, but the court intimated that it would
not have so held if the order had been based merely upon a statute providing for
examination of the debtor, except for his refusal to appear, because of no express
provision therefor. But the court seems to overlook the traditional power of an
equity court above referred to.
In conclusion, there can be little doubt that, despite widespread belief to the
contrary, the law is not unequipped to deal with the recalcitrant debtor mentioned
in the opening paragraph.
WARNER

22. Winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wis. 479
(1864).
23. Feldenheimer v. Tressel, 6 Dak.
265, 43 N. W. 94 (1889).
24. In re J. H. Small Shoe Co., 16 F.
(2d) 205 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Although the
order was made in bankruptcy proceedings,
it does not appear that it was based upon

G.

MAUPIN

any particular provision of the Bankruptcy
Act.
25. 19 N. J. Eq. 316, 97 Am. Dec. 666
(1868).
26. 20 Johns. 554 (1822).
27. 56 Minn. 397 (1894).
28. 49 Mo. 565 (1872).
29. 144 Mo. 653, 46 S. W. 15 (1898).
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OFFICERS-COUNTY AGENT AND THE MISSOURI COUNTY BUDGET LAw1-Under

the 1933 County Budget Law2 the county court is directed to classify expenditures
of the county into six named classes which are listed in order of priority, which priority
is to be sacredly preserved. This note touches only on classes four and six.
Class four: provides for the payment of the salaries and certain office supplies
"of all county officers [italics the writer's] where the same is by law made payable
out of the ordinary revenues of the county." Class six 4 authorizes the county court
to expend any balance for lawful purposes after the preceding designated five classes
are cared for, provided, however, that nothing shall be appropriated under class
six unless there is sufficient cash on hand to make all payments under the first five
classes and to pay outstanding warrants. Since the majority of counties have exhausted their funds by the time they reach class six, it is of great importance to
determine the question of whether certain public servants are officers or only employees. If they are officers, appropriations for their salaries and certain supplies
must be made from class four. If, on the other hand, they are employees, they fall
into class six, which, in most counties, contains no funds.
Courts have not laid down a uniform test for determining the line of demarcation between public office and public employment. However, generalizing from the
cases, one may say that a position is a public office when it is created by law, s not
by contract,' in which the incumbent performs duties involving an exercise of the
sovereign power,7 which are continuing in their nature s and when it is such as to
make the performance of the position of concern to the public. Some states have
distinguished, either in their constitution or by law, between an office and an employment. The Illinois constitution on this subject provides as follows: "An office is
a public position created by the constitution or law, continuing during the pleasure
of the appointing power, or for a fixed time, with a successor elected or appointed.
An employment is an agency, for a temporary purpose, which ceases when that
purpose is accomplished."' 9
One of the most perplexing questions confronting county courts in carrying
out the new Budget Law is that of the status of the county agent. If he is an officer,
certain of his office supply charges must be paid out of class four; if, on the other
hand, he is merely an employee, then this expense can be met only under class
six, which, in most counties, as noted, contains no funds. The Attorney General
of Missouri has ruled that this position is an employment and, therefore, the expense
of same must be paid out of class six,O which is, as stated, an impossibility in most
counties because of lack of funds over and above those needed in caring for the
first five classes. The Attorney General bases his ruling on the premise that the act
allowing the county courts to appropriate money to county farm organizations"i
merely authorizes such to be done, and that it is not mandatory on the court to so
1.
2.
3.
4.

Mo. Laws 1933, p. 340, et seq.
Ibid.
Ibid. § 2.
Ibid.

5.

State ex rel. Wingate v. Valley, 41

408, 17 S. W. 660 (1891); State ex rel. Hull v.
Gray, 91 Mo. App. 438 (1902); State ex rel.
Pickett v. Truman, 333 Mo. 1018, 64 S.W.
(2d) 105 (1933).
8.

State ex rel. Tedford v. Knott, 207

Mo. 29 (1867); Gracey v. St. Louis, 213 Mo.

Mo. 167, 105 S. W. 1040 (1907); United

381,7111S.

States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508 (1879).
9. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 24.
10. Opinion of Attorney General of
Missouri advising the Dunklin County

6.

1159
G (1908).
e.

United States v. Maurice, Fed. Cas.

No. 15,747 (D. Va. 1823); Harrington v.
State, 200 Ala. 480, 76 So. 422 (1917) at

423 says, "a public employment may be

created by law, or by contract; but a public

office can never be created by contract."
7.

State ex rel. Cannon v. May, 106 Mo.
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Court relative to the salary of the Secretary

of Farm Bureau Agent (April 16, 1935).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 12616 et
seq.
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act. However, the position might reasonably be taken that, although the act is
not mandatory, once the position is created, as authorized, it becomes an office.
In view of the above rulings distinguishing between an office and an employment, it would seem that a conclusion contrary to that of the Attorney General,
as to the status of the county agent, might well be reached. Analyzing the position
of county agent in the light of the essential characteristics of the office, it may be
plausibly argued that he is a public officer and that the expenses of his office are to
be paid from class four.
The position is created by statute, 12 and not by contract. As a matter of fact
there is no contract existing between the county agent, himself, and the county.3
The objects of the county farm organization, which together with the University
of Missouri selects the county agent, are clearly set forth in the statute.24 The duties
of the county agent in carrying out the statutory objectives of the farm organization would seem to be such as to prompt the Court to say that they involve the
exercise of the sovereign power. The Missouri Supreme Court in Jasper County
Farm Bureau v. Jasper County,5 ruled that appropriation of public funds to the
county farm bureau was appropriating money for a public purpose, and therefore valid. The decision in this case serves to indicate that the Court would have
little difficulty in finding that the duties of the county agent in carrying out this
public purpose are such as to amount to an exercise of the sovereign power of the
state, and such as to make the position one of concern to the public.
One of the chief requisites of an office is that the duties performed be of a continuing nature. An officer has duties of a permanent character, as opposed to occasional, transient and incidental duties. Looking at the position of county agent
from this viewpoint, one could well say that this element is met and that he is an
officer. By the statute providing for the county farm organization the county court
must appropriate, if at all, for a period of not less than three years.16 If the incumbent
is removed, dies or resigns, the position remains and a successor will continue with
the work. The duties are of a general nature, and not special. When a particular
task is finished the county agent is not through with his work but continues to care
for the everyday routine of his program.
There are other elements which may be helpful in deciding in particular cases
between a public office and an employment,7 but they are not controlling. Each
of the essential factors in making the distinction have been here considered. It is
submitted that in the light of the tests set forth, the county agent may well be considered an officer and his position an office. Therefore, under the classification provided by the County Budget Law the expenses of the county agent should be paid
from class four. s
HOWARD B. LANG, JR.
12. Ibid.
13. The only agreement which is had is
the memorandum agreement entered into
between the county farm organization and
the University of Missouri.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 12618.
.. .
15. 315 Mo. 560, 286 S. W. 381 (1926).

16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 12623.
17. Tenure provided by law; official
bond; oath of office; designation by the law
as an office.
18. For examples of specific positions
held offices (or employwhich
ments) have
see been
the annotation in (1928) 53
A. L. R. 595, (1934) 93 A. L. R. 333.
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